SAMUEL ROSENMAN REMEMBERS “THE PURGE” OF 1938

[Presidential speechwriter Samuel Rosenman included the following reminiscence in his 1952 memoirs.]

“Purge” was the name given by Roosevelt^'s opponents to his efforts to let people know what representatives were supporting his program and what representatives were not. It was certainly a loaded word. The President did not desire to prevent any community from choosing its own representatives; but he did desire that the people should make an informed choice, that they should not necessarily assume that all Democratic representatives--just because they were called Democrats--were supporting the Democratic administration or the Democratic platform. He hoped that, having the facts, the people would not return these men to office.

The purge had its birth in Roosevelt's personal resentment at the two major legislative defeats dealt him by members of his own party--the defeat of the Supreme Court plan in the spring and summer of 1937, and the defeat of two other pieces of legislation in the Extraordinary Session in the fall of 1937: the wages and hours bill and the administrative reorganization bill. There was no doubt of his animosity toward those who were willing to run on a liberal party platform with him and then vote against the very platform pledges on which they had been elected. I often heard him express himself about such “shenanigans” in a way that left no doubt about how he felt. But even deeper was his feeling--and I believe this was the fundamental reason for the purge--that the reactionary Democrats were doing a distinct and permanent injury to the nation. They were blocking the steps that he thought were essential to raise the American standard of living and make the nation strong enough to meet the growing menace from abroad.

The first factor--the personal one--was so strong that, in my opinion, it blinded the President to the great dangers to his own standing and prestige that were inherent in his entry into purely local primary party contests. His disregard of these dangers was also due to his confidence in himself and in the public support that he thought he could muster. Some of the people then very close to him whose judgment he trusted--notably Corcoran, Ickes and Hopkins--had been strongly urging this course. They had been active in trying to get the President's program through the Congress and had failed. Now they felt that the quickest way to remedy this failure was to prevent the re-election of some of those who had blocked him--with the idea that the other opponents would then capitulate. I heard the President express the same thought when it was suggested to him that a purge might be the wrong approach….

On the other hand, Farley and those most active in the Democratic National Committee did not want to pick and choose among Democrats as pro-New Deal or anti-New Deal. Indeed, I think Farley thought it was definitely no part of his function as chairman to interfere in these local fights. That is why Corcoran was in the purge fight and Farley out.

I am sure that by the end of the unsuccessful Extraordinary Session of 1937 the idea of the purge was rapidly forming in Roosevelt's mind, and that during the 1938 session it became fixed. For the first public announcement of it, he chose a fireside chat on June 24, 1938. The talk was ostensibly to discuss the accomplishments and failures of the Seventy-fifth Congress which had just adjourned....

In this fireside chat--delivered on one of the hottest of Washington nights--the President did three things: first, he listed the accomplishments of the session of the Congress just ended; second, he pointed out the acts of obstruction by the Congress; third, he stated what he intended to do about the Congressmen who were repudiating the platform on which they had been elected….

With these considerations and motives in mind, Roosevelt went out into the primary campaigns of 1938 in the home states of several Senators and Congressmen. It was a difficult, if not impossible, job that he had assumed. The men whom he tried to defeat were all popular in their own home states; they had all served for many years and had become firmly entrenched in their local political organizations. He was asking enrolled Democrats to reject these old officeholders; most of the voters to whom he was talking had voted for these same Congressmen time and again. Strong as the President's personal appeal and logic were, they were outweighed by the long personal relationships that these Congressmen had developed over the years with their constituents; by the entrenched political machinery which operated in favor of the Congressmen in office; by the fact that generally the candidates Roosevelt backed did not have sufficient political following or standing to produce the votes. Besides, there was present the resentment which is nearly always aroused to some degree when a national figure interferes in a local political situation in a state where he does not live and vote....

The only contest the President won was in New York, in the defeat of Congressman O^'Connor.

He never forgot the lesson of 1938--and never tried again.